One of these dates was December 18, 1995, at which time Mexican trucking companies could begin cross-border operations within the border states of Arizona, California, New Mexico and Texas. (US truckers, likewise, were to get reciprocal authority in the six Mexican border states.) By this it is meant that "Mexican motor carriers of property" could bring freight into the United States and deliver it to any point within the confines of these four border states. Likewise, they could pick up freight in any of the border states for delivery to destinations in Mexico They could not, however, pick up and deliver freight within or between points in the U. S . border states In other words the authority is between points in Mexico and points in the border states, but not between points in the U. S. border states.
Under NAFTA terms, on January 1, 1997, Mexican trucking companies were to be allowed to file applications to operate within US border states and to distribute international cargo (that is, cargo originating in Mexico) within the entire United States. Also, on that date, Mexican regular-route bus companies were to be allowed to begin scheduled cross-border service to and from any part of the United States. Neither of these events transpired, and are still "on hold". On January 1, 2000, Mexican truckers may file applications to operate within the entire United States, and on January 1, 2001, Mexican bus companies can be established in the United States to provide service between all U. S . points.
According to the Journal of Commerce, approximately 11,000 trucks cross the border each day from Mexico into the United States. Eighty percent of cross-border cargo moves by trucks. While there are 28 border crossing points, only seven are considered "major." Texas has 63% of border mileage, 57% of the entry points, and handles 66% of transborder traffic. California handles 24% of the traffic, and Arizona, 10%. New Mexico' s cross-border traffic is negligible.
Prior to December 18, 1995, and continuing to the present, NAFTA notwithstanding, freight coming into the United States by truck from Mexico has to be delivered to customers within the commercial zone of the U. S . cities along the border, as defined by the (former) Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), or else transloaded to a US trucking company within that zone. Mexican truckers have no "blanket" operating authority beyond those commercial zones. (While some US truckers had reciprocal arrangements in Mexico, for the most part Mexico kept US truckers out altogether, according to the American Trucking Associations.)
In reality, the ICC did not have the manpower necessary to effectively
enforce its regulations except upon specific complaint, and even then,
it could not enforce them very well. State and local police did not and
do not have the requisite authority to enforce those federal (ICC) regulations
pertaining to operating authority. The Interstate Commerce Act gave the
ICC sole authority to regulate operating rights on international surface
transportation under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. State and
local police can, however, enforce safety and insurance regulations within
their state borders, and do so, in varying degrees, with some help from
the U. S. Department of Transportation, in terms of both money and manpower.
Here in the United States, the Teamsters and other labor unions have been displeased about the real and potential loss of members' jobs due to the expanded operating authority extended to Mexican truckers. In fact, according to an article in the March 15, 1996 edition of the Journal of Commerce, on December 15, 1995, the Teamsters Union succeeded in having the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit order the (now abolished) Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to respond by 4 p.m., December 18, to union charges that an emergency stay blocking the border relaxation should be issued on grounds that Mexican truckers often fail to have adequate insurance employ licensed and qualified drivers, and often operate unsafe equipment. While the court's order to the ICC did not, in itself, stop the government from implementing the NAFTA plan to open the border, it certainly sent a very strong message that the Teamsters, in particular, were not happy with NAFTA's commercial trucking provisions. As previously mentioned, President Clinton did, in fact, decide on that date not to adhere to that part of the treaty, and that is the situation to this day.
On March 12, 1996, at what the Teamsters called a "NAFTA truck summit" in Chicago, the union announced plans for a publicity campaign against NAFTA in all three countries, (Canada, Mexico, and the United States.) The campaign drew support from labor unions in all three countries, as well as support from various independent truckers and drivers organizations in the United States, Canada and Mexico
In a report entitled ''Commercial Trucking, Safety and Infrastructure Issues Under the North American Free Trade Agreement" released in February 1996 by the General Accounting Office (GAO/RCED-96 61), GAO personnel who participated in and/or observed the inspection of Mexican trucks at several border crossings, reported that Mexican trucks failed to pass U. S. safety requirements twice as often as the U. S. average (56% vs 28%). GAO also reported that 14% of Mexican drivers (vs 8.5% for the United States) failed to meet US qualifications, and that 50% of Mexican trucks were built prior to 1980 (vs the US average of 22%). To this day, the principle stated reason for not adhering to the Treaty's trucking provisions is safety concerns.
Mexican regulations neither require drivers to keep logbooks of their hours, nor do they limit the number of hours Mexican truck drivers can be on duty. U. S. regulations require drivers to keep logbooks and place a 10-hour limit after which the driver must be "off duty" for 8 hours minimum. Mexican trucks are not required to have front wheel brakes as are U. S. trucks, and Mexico allows 97,000 pound gross vehicle weight, while the U. S. limit is 80,000 pounds, for the most part.
On the other hand, Mexico has a shorter maximum overall vehicle length requirement than does the United States, which effectively bars the 53-foot semi-trailers that are becoming the "norm" in the United States, from coming into Mexico unless the trailers are being pulled by so called "snub-nose" tractors. More properly called "cab-over engine" (COE) tractors, these snub nose units are considered especially uncomfortable by drivers, compared to the more conventional front-engine cabs. The COE's originally appeared in the United States as a way of handing longer semi-trailers while staying within U S. overall length limits of the time. The problem of 53-foot semi-trailers is highlighted here because shortly before the Clinton Administration decided against opening the borders on December 18, 1995, as called for in the NAFTA, Mexico, which had been largely overlooking the 53-foot restriction, said (or implied) that it would begin enforcing its length restriction regulations more vigorously. This angered a lot of U. S. truckers who soon began sending only the lesser available (in the Southwest, at least) 48-foot semi-trailers into Mexico, while, at the same time, voicing their displeasure with Mexico's action in Washington.
Under the NAFTA, a Land Transportation Standards Subcommittee was established to make U. S. and Mexican regulations more compatible. However, where they cannot be made so, the host country's regulations will apply.
Those concerned by what they view as an explosion of illegal immigration into the United States with all of the attendant ramifications are uneasy with allowing Mexican commercial truckers such wide access throughout the four border states. California and Texas, in particular, have a longstanding concern about illegal aliens.
According to a Special Report, "Transportation and NAFTA," published on March 14, 1996, in the Journal of Commerce, the Mexican Government is taking the Administration's ban more as a diplomatic snub than anything else. Surprisingly, to many observers, Mexican truckers do not seem too upset by the Administration's action nor do US truckers, who are similarly affected by the Administration's action. One of the main reasons offered for this seeming lack of immediate concern on the part of U. S. truckers is that crime in Mexico, especially truck hijacking, is causing serious operational and insurance problems for American as well as Mexican truckers and shippers. For example, according to an article in the March 19, 1996 edition of the Journal of Commerce, Proctor & Gamble's Mexican operation reports having lost 31 trucks to hijackers from January 1 through March 19, 1996 alone. Other companies, such as Levi Strauss and Sony, for example, are having difficulty getting truckers to transport their freight. Quite a few U. S. shippers of high-value merchandise are shipping by water to the Pacific port of Manzanillo and then via rail beyond. Others are shipping by air.
Compounding the theft/hijacking problem, Mexico requires that truckers insure cargo for only 17 cents a ton. The United States, by contrast, requires full coverage, for all practical purposes, and Canada requires $2 per pound. Premiums for additional insurance on cargo going to Mexico are, as might be expected, very high.
Finally, most US-based trucklines and railroads report that the NAFTA has, in practice, done very little to change the ways in which U. S.-Mexican land transportation is conducted. One of the main reasons--the biggest reason, by far--has to do, not with transportation problems, but with customs problems and other government-induced border delays. In an article entitled "Intermodal Experts Say NAFTA had Done Nothing for Transport," printed in the February 23, 1996 edition of the Journal of Commerce, the writer said that while reduced tariffs and the elimination of certain non-tariff trade barriers have brought increased Mexican-US trade, the increased volume has, if anything, tended to exacerbate the cross-border logistics problems. In an article appearing in the September 29, 1997 edition of the Journal of Commerce, it was reported that in 1998 the Customs Service will begin more aggressively monitoring compliance with US export laws and regulations on traffic going into Mexico. Customs is of the opinion that exports into Mexico are "undercounted by billions of dollars a year". This action is expected to add considerably to border delays.
While the decision by the Clinton Administration not to allow properly registered Mexican truckers to begin operating into the four US border states on December 18, 1995, has delayed progress on resolving many of the transportation problems that exist between Mexico and the United States, those problems will persist even after the border is opened further. For example, in a report released the week of August 10, 1997, the General Accounting Office found, among other things, that commercial passenger vehicles (buses and vans) entering the United States from Mexico had more than double the safety problems as do similar U. S . vehicles. Making matters worse, the report found that very few such commercial passenger vehicles crossing into the United States are inspected by either state or federal inspectors. Meanwhile, the Teamsters continue to strenuously oppose Mexican access, and Mexico has formally asked for a dispute resolution under Chapter 20 of the Agreement.
Copyright 1998 National Law Center for Inter-American Free Trade
1-[ See: US Congress. Senate. Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. Surface Transportation Implications of NAFTA. Hearing. 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. Washington, US Govt. Print. Off., May 4, 1993.]